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ABSTRACT
Given the recent enactment of the ADA Amendments Act, this article analyzes a
Rawlsian philosophical framework with which to view society’s treatment of people with
disabilities. Allocation of resources remains a pervasive concern of economists and
attorneys alike. Need, merit, and market compete as means by which to decide who
should receive what benefits. This article concludes that while economics can play a
powerful role in the initial allocation of limited resources, there remains a multifaceted
federal role to confront discrimination and promote equity.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) Amendments Act (“ADAAA”) went into
effect in 2009,1 rekindling the federalism debate regarding education. As an expansion of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,2 the ADAAA rejects the Sutton Trilogy3 requirement
that mitigating measures be factored into a disability analysis.4 Instead it reinstates the reasoning
of the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.5
*
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1
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as
portions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12214 and 29 U.S.C. § 705 (2008)).
2
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2009)).
3
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
527 U.S. 555 (1999); and Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
4
Congress expanded the Rules of Construction Regarding the Definition of Disability to
specify in (E)(i) that “[t]he determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major
life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures.” 42
U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i) (2009).
5
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, § 2(b)(2)-(3); see also School Bd. of Nassau County v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).

Eleven percent of students in higher education have disabilities,6 and ten percent of these
students have learning disabilities.7 A significant level of awareness has been raised concerning
the needs of people with disabilities, yet increased visibility and legal protections have been met
with strong resistance. While disability advocates speak of fundamental civil rights, opponents
speak of economic costs. Law and economics can provide much needed guidance based upon
well-reasoned theories and have contributed immeasurably to the sound application of laws and
policies. Law and society scholars have provided countervailing analyses that remain mindful of
the need for humane laws and policies.
This article begins by offering a philosophical framework with which to view society’s
treatment of people with disabilities. In doing so, Part II attempts to balance the predominantly
economic approach by which disability issues have been assessed. Part III then directly
addresses the economic way in which the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)8
has affected resource allocation to special education. Next, Part III considers what happens to
6

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-33, HIGHER EDUCATION AND
DISABILITY: EDUCATION NEEDS A COORDINATED APPROACH TO IMPROVE ITS ASSISTANCE TO
SCHOOLS IN SUPPORTING STUDENTS 6 (2009); see also Laura Rothstein, Higher Education and
Disability Discrimination: A Fifty Year Retrospective, 36 J.C. & U.L. 843, 871 (2010).
7
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-33, supra note 6, at 11. (noting that “the
return of veterans with a variety of conditions ranging from mobility impairments to post
traumatic stress disorder will present new challenges for colleges and universities. The Post-9/11
Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.110-252, 122 Stat. 2357 (codified at 38
U.S.C. § 3313 (2008)), provides funding for tuition and fees, housing, and other assistance for
returning veterans. This is likely to increase the number of individuals on campus returning from
active service. Not only might the services they request be challenging, but there may be legal
issues about documentation. Individuals returning from active service may not be able to get the
traditionally required documentation quickly from the military to justify an accommodation, and
institutions will need to determine whether they can adapt their policies to this new population”);
Rothstein, supra note 6, at 873; see also Paul D. Grossman, Foreword with a Challenge:
Leading Our Campus Away from the Perfect Storm, 22 J. POSTSECONDARY ED. & DISABILITY 4
(2009).
8
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat.
1142 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§1400-1482 (2006) (formerly known as the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act)).
2

individuals who fall outside of IDEA protection once they reach the age of twenty-one. Many
students in this situation have turned to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.9 In the postsecondary context, courts have struggled with the level of protection that the Rehabilitation Act
provides. Instead of explicitly addressing economic costs of compliance, much of the analysis in
this area has revolved around the clarification of who is “otherwise qualified.” Part IV addresses
the intense debate over legislative language that has continued, despite a Congressional effort to
strengthen its mandate to eliminate discrimination against disabilities by enacting the ADA.10 In
the context of higher education and professional entrance examinations, there has been less
mention of direct cost benefit analyses. Instead, the debate has revolved around academic
standards. Beneath this discussion, however, there is an economic productivity debate. The
following analysis focuses on the economic undercurrent that has pervaded the process of
establishing and implementing civil rights for people with disabilities. This article concludes
that while economics can play a powerful role in the initial allocation of limited resources there
remains a multifaceted federal role to confront discrimination and promote equity.
II. A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK WITH WHICH TO ASSESS DISABILITY LAW
The American legal philosopher, John Rawls, described a state of nature in which
individuals have complete freedom within the following hypothetical societal framework.11
People are initially identical with regard to physical strength, financial security, religion, race,
etc.12 Moreover, these fungible individuals have no idea what they will become in the future.13
9

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 794 (2011)).
10
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2009)).
11
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971).
12
David J. Popiel, The Debate Over the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Question of
Economics or Justice? 10 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 527, 530 (1995).
13
Id.
3

Given these two basic tenets, Rawls predicted that the rules people would establish would be fair
because no one would be able to skew them to benefit a given individual circumstance.14 In this
way, we can assess our own laws by considering whether a given rule would have been agreed
upon in Rawls’ state of nature.
Disability legislation, such as the ADA, holds up very well if such a Rawlsian
comparison is made. In fact, the disability field provides an excellent real-world scenario for
Rawls’ hypothetical decision-making process since no one knows whether they will have to
contend with a disability in the future.15 Since our ability to determine whether or not we would
individually benefit from disability legislation mirrors Rawls’ state of nature, it is not surprising
that ADA provisions in many ways reflect an undifferentiated decision-making process. Without
knowing one’s future, individuals would like to be assured that if they acquire a disability in the
future, society will provide basic accommodations. Similarly, if they decide to be employers in
the future, these same individuals would want to be assured that accommodating disabilities
would not be exceedingly expensive.16 Thus, Rawls provides a rationale for moving beyond a
utilitarian discussion of whether the ADA’s financial costs outweigh its financial benefits.17 As
Popiel notes,
The fact based utilitarian balancing act does not define fundamental fairness. If
the provisions of the ADA pass Rawls’ reason based state of nature test, they are
just, and there is a strong argument for retaining them in spite of their cost. Our
society glorifies the economic marketplace; but, in thinking about the worth of
laws, marketplace analysis has its limits.18
Much of the criticism of disability legislation is couched in the argument that the costs
outweigh the benefits. Cries that disability provisions such as the ADA are too expensive have
14

Id.
Id. at 531.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 531-32.
15
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been countered with assurances that the costs of accommodating disabilities are generally low.
Economic arguments have a useful place in society, but they cannot be relied upon as the only
indicator of what and how civil rights should be protected. It is important to assess measures that
protect people with disabilities in ways that go beyond a narrow framework of economic
efficiency. It is not sufficient to measure the quantifiable monetary successes or failures of
disability legislation to the exclusion of addressing attitudes and their philosophical
underpinnings. As Popiel notes, “[i]t is principles, not what you call ‘empirical data,’ that will
tell you what is right and what is wrong . . . . It is justice that we are after, and justice is not
always, or even often, amenable to precise measurement, or even to measurement at all.”19
Popiel goes on to point out that there are other expenditures for which society is willing to pay
that can be extremely costly. For instance, in the context of providing fair trials for criminal
defendants, looking solely at financial costs rather than the central issue of fairness is likely to
lead to a substantial reduction in procedural protections. The fact that we do not perform a pure
dollar and cents analysis in ensuring the right to a fair trial indicates that empirical reasoning is
not the only grounds upon which we make decisions. Communities allocate resources based
upon a combination of need, merit, and market. In the context of recognizing reasonable
accommodations for individuals with disabilities, an even playing field can be established by
interpreting and implementing federal legislation in a manner that balances efficiency and equity.
III. A PARADIGM SHIFT IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS DISABILITIES
Societies throughout history have often excluded or ignored people with disabilities.
Misconceptions of an inability for people with disabilities to contribute to society have fostered
continued discrimination. The piecemeal approach in which disability legislation has been
enacted provides a record with which to trace the gradual transition in perspectives.
19

Id. at 529.
5

The United States has come a long way in its treatment of people with disabilities.
Throughout the early 1800s states primarily institutionalized such individuals. Income
maintenance programs, such as Workers Compensation in 1911 and Social Security Disability
policy in 1935, marked the first attempts to establish a national disability policy. Benefits
initially consisted of financial support at a subsistence level, but with little accompanying effort
to welcome people with disabilities into mainstream society. World War I marked a turning
point in the role that the federal government has played in disability issues when the enormous
influx of returning veterans with disabilities prompted the government to establish vocational
rehabilitation services.20 The 1920s ushered in an era of vocational rehabilitation with a
“corrective” rational that would return people to the workplace. This economic, marketplace
approach sought to mold the individual with a disability into his or her existing surroundings,
rather than make an effort to alter the individual’s physical surroundings to accommodate his or
her needs, or confront the prejudice and ignorance that contributed to his or her exclusion. As a
result, individuals with disabilities remained isolated. A philosophical paradigm shift began in
the 1960s as people started to recognize that all individuals have a fundamental worth and
potential.
A. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Prior to 1973, any special education provisions that existed were based upon disability
legislation at the state level. Congress took steps to combat disability discrimination on a
national level by passing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.21 While the Civil Rights Act of 1964

20

Judith Welch Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal
Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
69 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 403 (1984).
21
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 794 (West 2011)).
6

did not provide protection from discrimination on the basis of disability, it did serve as a
foundation for the Rehabilitation Act.22
The Rehabilitation Act had the goal of “providing equal rights for the nation’s twentyeight to fifty million physically and mentally handicapped.”23 The Act implemented a program to
integrate people with disabilities into all areas of society. Section 504 of the Act states that, “No
otherwise qualified [handicapped individual] in the United States . . . . shall, solely by reason of
his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”24
While in the original Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the phrase “qualified handicapped
individual” only encompassed individuals who could benefit from employment, a 1974
amendment incorporated a broader definition containing the following three components: “(A) a
physical or emotional impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such an individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such
an impairment.”25 Under this definition, learning is considered a “major life activity.”
Therefore, people with learning disabilities are protected in their educational pursuits.
The Rehabilitation Act, and Section 504 in particular, has served as the foundation for
broad policies prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities. The Act contains
several serious weaknesses, however. Among the most important criticisms of the Rehabilitation
Act are that it is ambiguous in its language and is limited in its scope. Since only recipients of
federal financial assistance fell within the Act, much of the private sector could continue to
22

See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (2010)).
23
Steven W. Gerse, Mending the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 701,
701 (1982).
24
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 794(a).
25
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-651, §111(a), 89 Stat. 2, 2-3
(1974).
7

discriminate against people with disabilities. To remedy this flaw, Congress introduced new
legislation to strengthen the Rehabilitation Act’s protection.26 This process culminated in the
passage of the ADA, which is discussed further in Section IV.
B. Equal Access and Opportunities to Education
The doctrine of “separate but equal” did not reach the Supreme Court until1896 and was
not originally established in relation to disability, or to education. Instead, Plessy v. Ferguson27
involved transportation. The case most people associate with the doctrine, however, is Brown v.
Board of Education,28 in which African-American elementary school children in Topeka, Kansas
were given the right to go to an integrated school. Initially, the three-judge district court, found
that segregation in public education had negative effects on African-American children, but
denied relief on the ground that the segregated schools had roughly similar buildings,
transportation, curricula, and educational qualifications of teachers.29 Such a finding disregarded
the argument that segregation itself inflicted a sense of inferiority, which affected the motivation
of a child to learn. The Supreme Court concluded that “separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal.”30 This raises the question of how the “separate is unequal” conclusion
relates to individuals with disabilities.
Segregation of special needs students dates back at least as far as the 1800s when states
began organizing separate schools for the deaf and blind. Kentucky opened the first state school
for the deaf in 1823. Similar schools in Ohio, Massachusetts, and New York soon followed.
Special Education programs were not integrated into public schools, however, until the 1960s.
26

President Reagan created the National Council on Disabilities, which ultimately
authored Public Law 101-336, otherwise known as the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”).
27
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
28
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U. S. 483 (1954).
29
Id. at 486.
30
Id. at 495.
8

Even when physical integration did begin to take place, this development did not have a
significant effect on the teaching approach taken with special needs students or on their exposure
to peers who did not have disabilities. The contemporary concept of mainstreaming only began
in the 1970s in the wake of the following court cases and federal statutes.
In 1971, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (“PARC”) v. Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania challenged a state law that discriminated against children with disabilities based
on the assumption that they would be unable to profit from public school.31 Specifically, PARC
challenged the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute that excluded retarded children from
public schools.32 The Supreme Court struck down the statute and required Pennsylvania to stop
“deny[ing] to any mentally retarded child access to a free public program of education and
training.”33 This case was followed by Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia,
in which the court found that schools could not deny services on the basis of cost, but instead had
to extend the right to free and appropriate education to special needs children.34 The court held
that a school cannot exclude a child unless it provides, “adequate alternative educational services
suited to the child’s needs which may include special education or tuition grants . . . . [and] a
constitutionally adequate prior hearing and periodic review of the child’s status, progress, and
the adequacy of any educational alternative.”35
Mills is most often quoted for its requirement that districts must not exclude special needs
students on the basis of a school’s lack of resources. The court established this with the strong
statement that,

31

PARC v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
Id.
33
Id. at 1258.
34
Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
35
Id. at 878.
32

9

If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs that
are needed and desirable in the system then the available funds must be expended
equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly
supported education consistent with his needs and ability to benefit there from.
The inadequacies of the District of Columbia Public School System whether
occasioned by insufficient funding or administrative inefficiency, certainly cannot
be permitted to bear more heavily on the ‘exceptional’ or handicapped child than
on the normal child.36
This language in Mills and the protection outlined in PARC became instrumental in the creation
of subsequent federal legislation.
In 1975, Congress passed the Education For All Handicapped Children Act
(“EAHCA”).37 Both the House and the Senate reports attribute the impetus for this act to the two
federal court judgments previously discussed, PARC and Mills.38 Most importantly, the term
“appropriate” apparently came from these cases. In the PARC case, the district court required
that handicapped children be provided with “education and training appropriate to [their]
learning capacities”39 and in Mills, the district court referred to the need for “an appropriate
educational program.”40 The EAHCA was amended in 1990 and renamed the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).41
C. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)
Despite the growing realization that children with disabilities could benefit educationally
from being in the regular classroom, many states continued to deny educational services on the
basis of cost and institutional difficulty. In the early 1970s, it was estimated that one to two

36
37

Id. at 876.
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773

(1975).

38

Hendrick Hudson Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 (1982).
PARC v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
40
Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 879.
41
20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006) (describing the reasons for amending the EAHCA).
39
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million children were excluded from public school services.42 Congress used the conservative
one million figure to argue for the passage of IDEA and incorporated the “Child Find” program
into the legislation.43 This initiative succeeded in locating many previously-excluded children
with disabilities. While the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) estimated
that 463,000 children remained excluded from school in 1976, by 1980 the figure had dropped to
22,600.44 Just as excluded students were entering the public school system, the number of newly
identified special needs students increased dramatically rising from 2.1 million children in 1966,
to 4.2 million in 1982.45
1. Conflict between the Traditional Educational System and IDEA
Beyond the misconceptions people have about disabilities, acceptance of IDEA is further
hindered by the fact that the legislation is contradictory to the system in which it has been
implemented. IDEA introduces a needs-based approach into a merit-based educational system.46
Under the statute, the role of educational merit and needs are reversed. That is to say, the special
needs students who have the lowest performance often receive the most resources.47
While IDEA calls for an individualized educational program for a special needs student,
school systems are based on a system of standardization in which a set of uniform educational
opportunities is provided.48 In such a system, the ideal goal is to become blind to individual
backgrounds. In this respect, educators may see the inclusion movement as a way to bridge this
42

William H. Clune and Mark H. Van Pelt, A Political Method of Evaluating the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and the Several Gaps of Gap Analysis, 48
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 15 (1985).
43
Id. For information on “Child Find” see US Office for Special Education at
http://www.childfindidea.org/overview.htm.
44
Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 42, at 15.
45
Id.
46
20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(3) (2006).
47
Katherine T. Bartlett, The Role of Cost in Educational Decisionmaking for the
Handicapped Child, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 24-26 (1985).
48
Id. at 20.
11

discrepancy between individual and collective approaches. Yet, inclusion sometimes becomes
an economic catchall approach for denying services. The placement of all children with
disabilities in the regular classroom is as great a violation of IDEA as is the placement of all
children in separate classrooms on the basis of their type of disability. Inclusion is not
universally good or evil. Different children require different services. For instance, a Down
Syndrome child benefits from socialization opportunities in the regular classroom, while a child
with a mild learning disability benefits from separate, remedial academic skill-building. Those
seeking socialization can benefit from inclusion but this should not be grounds for insisting that
children who are seeking the same educational goals as their non-disabled peers can equally
benefit from inclusion. Watering down a concept so that it can be learned within the constraints
of the traditional classroom does not help the latter. The basis of inclusion is a modified
curriculum, essential for some children with disabilities and inadequate for others.
IDEA brought a compulsory funding requirement into a political system of resource
allocation―a system in which negotiations determine how much money goes where.49 The
following political disadvantages facing special needs students at the local level indicate why
Congress deemed it necessary to ensure their individual rights. Discomfort and prejudice toward
people with disabilities remains widespread. Greater understanding is hindered by the reality
that teachers and administrators are overburdened and are already struggling to adjust to funding
shortages, while juggling increasingly overcrowded classrooms, high student-teacher ratios, and
outdated facilities.50 Despite the need to protect children with disabilities from systematic
discrimination, introducing federal control into a system historically run by state and local

49
50

Id. at 21.
Id. at 23.
12

decision-makers increased the animosity of schools toward special education.51 When public
education was first created in the United States, decisions were made on a local level by parents
and the local government.52 During the nineteenth century, schools were consolidated and
increasingly made accountable to states.53 In contrast, the uniform federal procedures
established under IDEA limit local autonomy. This was a change in the role of the federal
government, which had traditionally been concerned with increasing access to education rather
than setting standards for the content of educational programming.54
2. Funding Special Education and the Complexity of Disability Evaluations
Realizing that IDEA created an expensive compliance burden for states, Congress
incorporated a partial funding mechanism into the legislation.55 This federal aid would not
compensate for all the costs of compliance but it was hoped that the money would ease the
burden of providing evaluations and new programs and make districts more willing to change
organizational routines and attitudes. As a result, schools receive special education funding in
proportion to the number of children identified with disabilities.56 Linking funding to the
labeling process, however, does not give schools the additional incentive to make sure services
are appropriate.
A common criticism of special education is that labeling drives the services. That is to
say, a school’s access to funding affects a child’s eligibility and placement recommendations.
There is a disincentive to provide for new disabilities because each new category dilutes the
funding available to existing programs. These circumstances have led many advocates to argue
51

Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2005).
56
20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(2)(B)(i) (2005).
52
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for the separation of funding from the evaluation process. Even if this were to occur, however,
other issues remain problematic. For instance, states have had widely divergent standards of
whom and what defines a given disability. In 1977, “thirty states had definitions of mental
retardation inconsistent with the [IDEA] definition.”57 Even if a district has a broad definition of
eligibility, under-referrals may result from a backup in the assessment process, overcrowding of
programs, or personality traits.58 To clarify the latter, if a child is not disrupting the class, a
teacher may not realize he or she is having difficulty. One way to mitigate under-referrals is to
increase special education training among regular classroom teachers. This may or may not lead
to the opposite problem of over-referrals. Referring children too often results when teachers are
at their wits’ end with disruptive students.
3. Competing Interests
Despite valid criticisms, IDEA did provide funding, moral authority, a standard of free
and appropriate education, and the leverage to ask for new organizational procedures.59 IDEA
offers a “demand entitlement” which can be used by those willing to request change.60 This
change, however, depends on the given party’s resources to demand it. IDEA gives parents a
litigation entitlement, as opposed to a clear entitlement of say $1,000 for a given disability. As a
result, parents are limited by the cost of litigation yet not confined by a fixed voucher or
categorical grant in a fluctuating economy. This pragmatic approach limits social change to
balancing the competing economic and ethical interests of parents and schools.
Unfortunately, litigation entitlements have a number of disadvantages. First, legal goals
do not consider the existing competition between priorities. Second, legal remedies do little to
57

Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 42, at 18.
Id. at 22-23.
59
See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2005).
60
Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 42, at 39.
58
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address bureaucratic red tape or genuine technical ignorance. Special education cannot have an
unlimited budget, despite the current views of parents seeking to recover very large sums of
money for private placements. Schools will either attempt to balance special education
provisions with those allocated to non-disabled children or they will resist accommodating
special needs students because there is no pressure to do so or because the legal provisions are
impossible to comply with, given budgetary constraints. Third, legal objectives generally do not
address the expense of compliance. As a result, districts opt for surface compliance. In
assessing the merits of such compliance, however, it is important to realize the validity of the
competing interests. The educational rights of non-disabled students, normal working hours, a
teacher’s ability to teach effectively, and efficient use of taxpayers’ money are not discriminatory
objectives. Assessing them, however, does not necessarily mean giving them a higher priority
than the needs of children with disabilities.61
4. An Economic Model for Allocating Special Education Services
Maximizing efficiency between two populations of children, those with disabilities and
those without disabilities, is a function of schools and parents. In identifying a source of market
failure in this context, this Article focuses on maximizing the efficiency of education for all
children. Schools and parents become primary decision-makers, each of whom must maximize
their objectives subject to their respective budgets. As rational decision-makers, parents seek to
maximize their utility. They do this by maximizing educational opportunity for their child(ren)
given their budget constraints. Similarly, as rational decision-makers, schools seek to maximize
educational benefit across the two populations of children: those with regular educational needs
and those with special needs.

61

Id. at 41.
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To what extent do parents have the right to shift their budget lines outward by requiring
schools to finance services for their special needs child(ren)? IDEA mandates a free and
appropriate education for all handicapped children, but what is appropriate? The analysis is
complicated by the fact that some parties are seeking greater access for special needs students in
regular classrooms while others are seeking a greater number of out-of-class services. In
conducting a cost-benefit analysis for special education, parents must weigh the needs of their
child(ren) against personal budget constraints and the opportunity cost of other personal needs.
Conversely, schools must analyze their opportunity cost of providing educational services to
non-disabled children, given the externality of future cost to society of individuals with
disabilities.
What incentives do schools have to spend more money on special education now to save
costs for other sectors of the society later? Are funding patterns toward education efficient,
given the crucial role human capital plays in our economy? Should each student be competitive
in getting a good job or simply able to obtain economic survival? Is it the school’s responsibility
to prepare all its students for higher education or should vocational training be the objective?
Must reading and spelling be mastered perfectly before pursuing abstract ideas? The answers to
these kinds of questions greatly effect what are the perceived needs of a child. Furthermore,
perspectives on a child’s needs will vary depending on whether the school takes a short-term
perspective of a school year or a long-term perspective of the life span of the special needs
person. Do the opposing goals of schools and parents create a paradox of compensation or can
special education law create efficient incentives for both schools and parents? Investing in
education can reduce support cost later on. A given school, however, does not directly benefit
from the costs that are saved in the individual’s adult years. Therefore, there is a lack of local

16

incentive to pay the price of benefits to other sectors of society in the future. As funding for
education continues to decrease in relation to the demand for services, the controversy over
resource allocation mounts.62
5. The Rowley Case
Hendrick Hudson District Board of Education v. Rowley63 provides a landmark judicial
interpretation of the level of services that IDEA requires. The Supreme Court restrictively
interpreted IDEA to require schools to provide merely “adequate” educational benefit.64 Mr. and
Mrs. Rowley sought a sign-language aide for their daughter, Amy.65 She had minimal residual
hearing but was an excellent lipreader.66 As plaintiffs on Amy’s behalf, her parents argued that
refusing to provide Amy with a sign language interpreter when she entered first grade was a
denial of a “free appropriate public education” under IDEA.67 The court found that Amy
performed better than average in the class and was advancing easily from grade to grade, despite
understanding less than half of what went on in the classroom.68 There was a clear disparity
between Amy’s actual achievement and potential. On these grounds, the district court decided
that Amy was not being provided a “free appropriate public education.”69 The court defined the
latter as “an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the opportunity
provided to other children.”70 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the lower court’s
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ruling that Amy should be provided with a sign language interpreter.71 Instead the Court found
that since she was receiving an “adequate” education, was performing above average work, and
was receiving some personalized instruction and services the lower court should not have found
that IDEA required anything further.72
In his dissent, Justice White disagreed with the Court’s conclusion that IDEA only
mandated “adequate” educational benefit.73 He pointed out that Congress did not intend courts
to end all inquiry if a child is performing on grade level. In fact, Congress repeatedly used the
term “full” rather than anything that could be interpreted to mean “adequate.” As Justice White
explains,
[t]he Act itself announces it will provide a “full educational opportunity to all
handicapped children” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(A) (emphasis added). This goal is
repeated throughout the legislative history, in statements too frequent to be
‘passing references and isolated phrases’ . . . . Congress wanted not only to bring
handicapped children into the schoolhouse, but also to benefit them once they had
entered.74
Justice White goes on to criticize the majority opinion’s use of the PARC and Mills cases.75 He
contends that, the fact that “these decisions served as an impetus for the Act does not, however,
establish them as the limits of the Act.”76
Allocating resources for special education appears to create a paradox of compensation.
If the law requires that a child be afforded the maximum development possible then schools have
an efficient incentive to identify and serve children with disabilities. Parents, on the other hand,
do not have efficient incentives. They do not have anything obligating them to make sure the
cost of a service is offset by the benefit to their child. On the other hand, if the law only requires
71
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that “adequate” educational services which offer merely “some” educational benefit be afforded
to a special needs child, then parents are the ones who have efficient incentives to find out what
services are essential. Schools, on the other hand, do not have efficient incentives to provide
services beyond the first increment of educational benefit. The incentive on the part of schools
to provide as little as possible, is what concerned Justice White in the Rowley case and has led
several states to establish standards above the Rowley precedent of “adequate” educational
benefit.77 The following section seeks to strike a balance between educationally beneficial
services and those ensuring maximum possible development.
6. Proportional Quality
IDEA requires that every child has a right to a free and appropriate education in the least
restrictive setting possible.78 Yet, interpreting these provisions can be confusing. For example,
does a child have access to special education if there is a testable disparity between achievement
and potential, or merely if that disparity is below grade level (i.e., the underlying issue in the
Rowley case)? A general misunderstanding of disabilities aggravates such complexities.
Disabling conditions do not preclude students from performing above grade level. In fact, it has
been estimated that one sixth of the population of gifted children have disabilities.79
Currently, enormous but inadequate amounts of money are being invested in special
education. These funds undoubtedly help a large number of children. It is important, however,
77
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to make sure the value of a service to a given child is greater than the cost of the service. This is
not synonymous with determining that the value to the child is greater than the value of an
alternative resource to non-disabled children. For example, if an aide for a special needs child
can only be afforded at the expense of a classroom chalkboard, it makes sense to ensure that the
benefit of an aide to the child with a disability justifies the cost of the aid. While administrative
biases and discrepancies in defining value (i.e., economic productivity verses individual dignity)
can make the benefit hard to calculate, it is clear that the service should be worthwhile to its
recipient. In contrast, determining whether the special needs child can use the aide more
productively than the other students can use the chalkboard legitimizes replacing the rights of
less highly valued individuals with the rights of more highly valued individuals. To give up
something in the present in order to receive something greater in the future may be efficient. To
require one group of children to sacrifice something so that another group can have something,
even if the gain is greater than the loss, is not efficient. Pareto Efficiency requires that the party
not being made better off is at least not made worse off.80 Unlike a strict cost-benefit analysis,
proportional quality programming does not compare services on the basis of goals but rather sees
each group of children as having entitlements to the same degree of respect and a right to learn.
While it is unrealistic not to consider costs in determining special education services
within a system that is forced to weigh the costs and benefits of every other aspect of its
program, the issue of cost should be confronted directly, not disguised under the educational
term “least restrictive environment.” Cost considerations must be made on a quality basis. If
schools only compare costs, they will continue to systematically deny special education
80
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programs on the basis of higher cost. If sacrifices must be made, they should be made across the
board instead of always being made by a single group of students. Therefore, before costs are
used to legitimize not providing an educationally beneficial special service, schools have to offer
special needs students a program that is comparable in quality to the program available to nondisabled students.81
A proportional quality approach can narrow the discrepancy between the
nondiscriminatory mandate of Section 504 and the affirmative requirements imposed by IDEA.
A child with a disability must be able to benefit from the instruction under IDEA. Section 504,
on the other hand, merely requires that a handicapped child be offered the same educational
access as a non-disabled child. Additionally, Section 504’s protection does not bring money
with it. Federal funding determines whether Section 504 is applicable but the money does not
have to be disability funding. Section 504 is a civil rights law rather than a funding law. While
IDEA provides more detailed provisions for those who qualify, Section 504 extends to a range of
individuals with disabilities who are not protected under IDEA. Many college students, for
example, find that the accommodations that they received throughout elementary and secondary
school are no longer protected in post-secondary pursuits since IDEA only covers individuals
with disabilities up to the age of twenty-one. 82 The following discussion focuses on the struggle
that post-secondary students have experienced.
D. An “Otherwise Qualified Individual” Under Section 504
One of the greatest obstacles that post-secondary students have faced pursuant to Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, has been to successfully argue that they are an “otherwise
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qualified individual with a disability.” Southeastern Community College v. Davis83 was the first
case to interpret the meaning of this phrase under the Rehabilitation Act. In Davis, a woman
with a hearing impairment brought suit under Section 504 after being denied admission to a
clinical nurse-training program.84 The district court entered a judgment for the university,
concluding that Davis’s handicap would prevent her from safely participating in the training
program.85 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, based on the finding that
Southeastern had to evaluate the plaintiff’s credentials without considering any limitation that
would result from her handicap.86 The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeal’s reasoning
and held that “[a]n otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program’s
requirements in spite of his handicap.”87 Furthermore the Court concluded that,
[the] respondent could not participate in Southeastern’s nursing program unless
the standards were substantially lowered. Section 504 imposes no requirement
upon an educational institution to lower or effect substantial modifications of
standards to accommodate a handicapped person.88
Davis allowed educational institutions to merely demonstrate a rational basis for denying
admission on the basis of disability. A university was not required to make any “reasonable
accommodations” to permit a student with a disability to participate.
The Supreme Court did not establish the “reasonable accommodations” standard until
1985. Alexander v. Choate89 called for the Supreme Court to review its earlier holding in Davis.
In Alexander v. Choate, the Court concluded that, “while a grantee need not be required to make
‘fundamental’ or ‘substantial’ modifications to accommodate the handicapped, it may be
83
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required to make ‘reasonable’ ones”90 The Court also altered its previous holding in Davis with
regard to the term “otherwise qualified.”91 In Davis, an individual was not “otherwise qualified”
unless he or she was able to meet all of a program’s requirements in spite of a disability.92 In
Alexander v. Choate, on the other hand, an individual could still be “otherwise qualified” even if
he or she required “reasonable accommodations” to meet all of a program’s requirements.93
While Alexander v. Choate concerned a medical policy rather than a post-secondary context, it
did substantially affect the analysis regarding students seeking accommodations for disabilities.94
Reasonable accommodations can be difficult to determine. Hidden disabilities, such as
dyslexia, have proven to be particularly controversial. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
sought to provide a clearer interpretation of the Alexander v. Choate reasonable accommodation
requirement in Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine95 by establishing the following
standard:
If the institution submits undisputed facts demonstrating that the relevant officials
within the institution considered alternative means, their feasibility, cost and
effect on the academic program, and came to a rationally justifiable conclusion
that the available alternatives would result either in lowering academic standards
or requiring substantial program alteration, the court could rule as a matter of law
that the institution had met its duty of seeking reasonable accommodation.96
Wynne argued that he failed several first year medical classes as a result of having dyslexia and
that, therefore, the university discriminated against him in not modifying the standard multiple90
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choice exams to accommodate his learning disability.97 The court deferred to the University’s
academic judgment that modifying multiple-choice examinations did not constitute a reasonable
accommodation.98 While the court ultimately decided in favor of the University, the case did
clarify the notion that a university must fully defend its grounds for revoking admission of a
student with a disability. The Interpretive Guidelines for the ADA, drafted by the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) point out that,
given the similarities between Section 504 and the ADA, many of the statutory interpretations of
Section 504 can be used in evaluating the ADA.99 Therefore, the decisions made in Davis,
Alexander, and Wynne may apply to the ADA as well.
IV. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
The purpose of the ADA is “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”100 Perhaps the greatest
achievement of the ADA is its extension of disability rights to the private sector. This corrected
a fundamental flaw in the government’s efforts to bring people with disabilities into mainstream
society—a goal that Section 504’s limited scope was inherently unable to achieve. As John J.
Sarno points out,
The primary intent of the ADA is to eradicate day-to-day discrimination against
persons with disabilities.
The ADA represents an attempt to legislate
comprehensive social policy by barring attitudinal as well as environmental
barriers. Such an effort demonstrates a society working to transform itself by
striking a balance between the morality of the marketplace and the imperative of
equal opportunity.101
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In contrast, critics of the ADA see it as an effort on the part of Congress simply to privatize the
expense of accommodating people with disabilities.102
A. Administrative and Judicial Enforcement
It is important to ensure not only a strong, well-funded, and capable infrastructure to
enforce the ADA, but also a staff knowledgeable and supportive of its statutory goal of
eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Ultimately, neither Congress nor
the judiciary is capable of legislating a change in attitudes towards people with disabilities.
Laura Rothstein notes that institutions of “[h]igher education had evolved practices, policies, and
procedures before other sectors affected by the ADA (with the exception of K-12 education).”103
Society-wide, integration is at best a precursor to acceptance. It is not acceptance itself. Carrie
Basas notes that, “the daily struggle of managing other people’s reactions to and stereotypes
about disability can become a job in itself.”104 She goes on to point out that,
When “reasonable accommodation” is bandied about, minds ultimately turn to a
list of tangible tools, equipment, and changes in the physical environment such as
large-screen monitors, curb cuts, automatic doors . . . . without considering the
combined effects of impairments, the cultural weight of disability, and the longterm impact of societal inaccessibility.105
Enforcement of established civil rights and clear guidelines as to what those rights entail are
essential to eliminate discrimination. The legislature must adequately fund and staff
enforcement entities. This legislative approach, however, is not always sufficient in confronting
the problem of clarifying the language of the ADA. Courts must play the important role of
102
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making statutory interpretations that are consistent with the legislative intent of eradicating
discrimination. Assessing the ADA depends, in part, on what one interprets its mandate to be.
Thus far, however, a great deal of the ADA analysis has remained at the initial level of
determining whether the individual can even qualify as having a “disability.” One area in which
this has been difficult has been for post-secondary students with learning disabilities. As Wendy
Hensel notes,
[t]he problem for most students in higher education, particularly those in graduate
or professional school, is that they have attained a level of educational
achievement which surpasses the majority of Americans. Some large cities have
nearly 50% of their students drop out of high school with no diploma, and
nationally less than one-third of all adults attain college degrees. There is
abundant evidence that the average person cannot read at a high school level, let
alone at a collegiate one.106
The following case exemplifies the ongoing struggle that law students continue to face with
regard to seeking reasonable accommodations on bar examinations.
B. The Bartlett Case
In Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners,107 despite being given extra time
throughout law school, on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination and on the
Pennsylvania Bar Examination, the New York State Board of Law Examiners repeatedly denied
Dr. Bartlett’s applications for accommodations based upon a learning disability.108
Individuals with learning disabilities often have a difficult time conveying their skills on
standardized tests that are timed, yet, New York Bar Board member Laura Taylor Swain testified
that the bar examination is not intended to measure the ability to work under time constraints.109
Rather, the Board assumes that there is sufficient time for the average person to answer the
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questions.110 In fact, the Board has never attempted to determine what reading speed is needed
under standard conditions.111 Instead they assume that there is enough time for most people.112
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that a
reading disorder cannot be assessed solely by the Woodcock Reading Mastery Test (“WRMT”),
a standardized test of reading mastery, since it does not make distinctions between rates of
automaticity, nor does it measure the ability to recognize and read a word with fluency.113
Furthermore, the WRMT was created to test children and does not have a sufficient number of
difficult questions for the average adult.114 Most importantly, since the WRMT is not a timed
test, it is incapable of measuring how slowly someone reads, which is a significant component of
diagnosing an adult with dyslexia.115
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that Dr. Bartlett does have a disability
pursuant to the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.116 Yet, the court of appeals held that the district
110
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court erred in going as so far as to find whether Dr. Bartlett had a disability with regard to her
ability to “work” since the district court could have concluded that she has a disability that
substantially limits her major life activities of “reading” and “learning.”117 Given her reading
and learning disability, the court of appeals held that the district court’s ultimate conclusion, that
Dr. Bartlett requires reasonable accommodations, was correct.118
A person has a disability under the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act if, he
or she has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more [of the] major
life activities.”119 While neither of these statutes defines this language, Congress authorized the
EEOC to issue regulations regarding discrimination in the workplace under Title I of the
ADA.120 Congress authorized the DOJ to issue interpretive guidelines regarding discrimination
in public and private service organizations under Titles II and III of the ADA.121 Dr. Bartlett
brought suit against the Board as a public licensing entity pursuant to Title II of the ADA.122 She
argued that she had an impairment that substantially limited her major life activities of
“learning,” “reading” and “working.”123 The DOJ’s regulations defining “physical or mental
impairment” pursuant to Title II of the ADA include “specific learning disabilities.”124
Furthermore, these regulations define “major life activities” as expressly including “learning and
working.”125 Title II regulations do not clarify the meaning of “substantially limits,” but the DOJ
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has said to look to Titles I and III in interpreting Title II, as long as these provisions are not
inconsistent with the Rehabilitation Act regulations.126
The Second Circuit held that self-accommodating measures employed by Bartlett should
not be considered when determining whether she was substantially limited in a major life
activity.127 Given the Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton that mitigating measures should be
part of a substantially limited determination, the case was remanded to the district court.128 The
district court held that Bartlett was not substantially limited given her self-accommodation
measures.129 The Second Circuit disagreed for a second time, finding that average skills on some
measures did not offset below average skills on other measures when the latter substantially
limited her ability to read.130 Slow reading speed could be distinguished from wearing contact
lenses, which is what the district court used as a comparison.131
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The legal community should promote the understanding that lawyering is just as much
about coming up with creative legal arguments as it is about being able to read quickly. The real
question should be whether the person who wishes to be a lawyer has the analytical and creative
skills to contribute to the profession. We do not ask people whether they can walk the fifteen
miles it might take to get to work each morning. We recognize that with the use of a car they can
arrive at work on time. Frequently, disabilities can be reasonably accommodated. Yet, it
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remains to be seen how broadly the judicial system will be willing to interpret Congress’s
mandate.132
Finding that Bartlett does not read at the level of an average person is similar to Justice
White’s dissent in Rowley. In Rowley, Justice White used the Mills finding to argue that
providing Amy with an equal educational opportunity would require an interpreter since, in
comparison to her classmates, she could only understand half of what was going on in the
classroom.133 Having a Ph.D. and a J.D. would generally be considered to be above average, yet
in the same way Justice White broke Rowley’s disability into its component parts, the court of
appeals in Bartlett concluded that Dr. Bartlett’s impairments in automaticity and phonological
processing cause a substantial limitation to a major life activity.
Reasonable accommodation of a learning disability offers a useful sliver of the disability
debate with which to assess the powerful role that the ADAAA can play in restoring the civil
rights of people with disabilities. The ADAAA’s clarification of definitions applies to both the
ADA and to the Rehabilitation Act giving students generally and law students with learning
disabilities in particular clear rights to reasonable accommodations that help them read,
concentrate, and learn. While the ADAAA did not need to strengthen “reasonable
accommodation” language under the ADA since it was already a very comprehensive
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framework, this article recommends that federal disability legislation’s broad “reasonable
accommodation” provisions be implemented without further delay.
Litigation may turn on nuanced hardship analyses134 but general recognition should be
forthcoming that, as the EEOC explains, “most accommodations can be provided at little or no
cost.”135 Mastroianni goes on to address the important role of law schools in following through
on the ADA’s mandate:
I think it's important for us to take a step back and look at how wrong the United
States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts were in interpreting this law.
What are we not getting across in legal education that’s enabling judges and
enabling attorneys who are working with these laws to understand that, yes, the
definition of “disability” is broad; that yes, it’s a remedial civil rights statute and
it should be interpreted broadly.136
I recommend that legal education emphasize the acquisition of critical thinking skills and the
effectiveness of a combination of superior intellect, judgment, dedication, and interpersonal
skills in serving society. Part of this paradigm shift involves achieving a broader recognition of
assistive technology and other reasonable accommodations as well as recognition of leaders in
the legal profession who have disabilities. The National Association of Law Students with
Disabilities has begun establishing mentoring and networking communities.137 Existing
networks of all stripes can help support the disability community to thrive in a legal arena.
Disability is a cross-cutting issue that can and should be considered with regard to
infrastructure, assistive technology, and educational theory. Recognizing that universal design
can optimize learning and assessment across an entire learning community can lead to increasing
134

Conference Panel, supra note 132, at 30.
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Reasonable Accommodations for
People with Disabilities, EEOC, www.eeoc.gov/facts/accommodations-attorneys.html (last
visited Feb. 2, 2011); see also Donald H. Stone, The Disabled Lawyers Have Arrived; Have They
Been Welcomed with Open Arms Into the Profession? An Empirical Study of the Disabled
Lawyer, 27 LAW & INEQ. 93, 103 (2009).
136
Conference Panels, supra note 132, at 24.
137
Id. at 26.
135

31

small group interaction, take-home assignments, and a range of multi-sensory teaching
approaches. Computers have allowed many attorneys with disabilities to work independently,
reducing the need to request accommodations. For others it is still important to obtain extended
exam and assignment time, interpreters, texts in an alternate format, etc. Beyond task-based
accommodations, individual law schools, the American Bar Association (“ABA”), and the
American Association of Law Schools (“AALS”) can collectively play a powerful role in
supporting the establishment and linkage of disability support and advocacy communities.
My recommendation, as courts begin to balance reasonable accommodations vis-a-vis
academic and licensing standards under the ADAAA,138 is to implement best practices that
maximize optimal learning and assessment conditions for everyone. While cost is a concern to
legal and professional institutions alike, equity and efficiency can be balanced through broad
implementation of requisite reasonable accommodations pursuant to federal disability legislation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the over three decades since the passage of the Rehabilitation Act in 1973 we have
come a long way in ensuring that the civil rights of people with disabilities are respected. Given
the lag time between passing such laws as the ADA and having them effectively implemented,
the law is still in it’s infancy in coming to terms with recognizing civil rights on the basis of
138
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disability. We have a great deal of work yet to do to embrace individuals who have disabilities
on a participatory level.
IDEA did succeed in ending the exclusion of students with disabilities from public
school, providing a range of special education programs, and giving schools incentives to
increase their provisions for children with disabilities. In return for complying with federal
statutory mandates, Congress provides states with partial funding. Therefore, if states offer
special education services within certain specifications, they can receive federal aid. While this
has helped schools create programs, it has also distorted the identification process. As a result,
the labeling process sometimes drives services. Separating special education services from
funding mechanisms, however, would dismantle the equilibrium of incentives. If IDEA were not
funded, schools would have inefficient incentives to provide services. That is to say, schools
would have a strong incentive to avoid identifying students with disabilities. If IDEA were fully
funded, however, there would be no incentive to make sure the costs of the service were
worthwhile to the special needs child. In this way, IDEA enables change by providing new
resources, but the change is bound by the limitations of these resources.
If enough states increase the standard of educational services provided to children with
disabilities, then the Supreme Court may overturn the Rowley precedent. The paradox of
compensation, however, illustrates that the latter would simply reverse incentives—still leaving
one party with the incentive to be inefficient in analyzing the costs and benefits of providing
special education services. Proportional quality programming, on the other hand, can alleviate
the tension created by establishing individualized rights for one disadvantaged group by
evaluating those rights in relation to legitimate goals of the system in which those rights must be
provided. The success of a quality approach, however, depends on decision-makers’ ability to
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remain committed to establishing protective rights for special needs children without allowing
these rights to preempt those of non-disabled children. In this way, we can go beyond simply
allowing every child to occupy a chair in the classroom to providing each child the opportunity
to learn.
What happens, however, when students who are over the age of twenty-one try to request
accommodations in undergraduate and graduate programs? Higher education is becoming an
essential credential in a competitive market place. IDEA, however, no longer protects these
students’ rights to special accommodations. Ultimately, individual biases cannot be eliminated
through legislation. However, when those personal misconceptions affect an individual’s ability
to pursue their legal right to equal education and access to professional entrance examinations,
then it is society’s responsibility to end such institutionalized discrimination.
In our society, we need to recognize how dangerous it is to set aside individuals who are
unable to conform to a given mold no matter how economically or socially efficient restricted
access may appear. In Rawls’ theory of justice, individuals are put in a room without knowing
where in society they would return.139 They are deprived of a sense of history and thus do not
know whether they were a minority group in the past or will be so in the future. This veil of
ignorance takes away all cultural and historical perspective. Rawls first tenet, that there would
be a maximum level of liberty, would ensure that each person has as much liberty as possible as
long as everyone else has the same level of liberty. His second tenet that social and economic
inequalities would be arranged in accordance with the greatest benefit of the least advantaged
and that positions would be open to all ensures equal opportunity. In predicting what maxims
people would create for society, Rawls points out that no one would want to be on the bottom.140
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People would decide to make everyone equal—thus, maximizing the benefit of the least
advantaged in order to raise them up to the same level as those who are already advantaged.
While Rawls does not provide a historical account of how people have gone about
protecting civil rights, his theory of justice provides a useful philosophical rational for granting
such rights. Like any model, there are problems with thinking that reality will correspond
perfectly with such a hypothetical state of society. Lack of exposure and understanding of
disabilities in general can skew people’s commitment to providing a sufficient safety net in the
area of disability protection. A substantial body of litigation provides evidence of this lack of
commitment. Furthermore, there are some disabilities to which people do not believe they would
be susceptible. Ignorance and irrational discounting of personal risk can lead to an insufficient
level of disability protection.
There are disabilities that tend not to develop until later in a person’s life. Despite the
fact that learning disabilities can result from severe head injuries, people who do not already
have a learning disability generally do not believe that they are susceptible to such a condition.
Thus, applying Rawls decision-making model to accommodating the needs of people with
learning disabilities may not work as well as applying the theory to accommodating a condition
to which people feel more susceptible. The scenario is complicated by the level of ignorance
about the hidden nature of learning disabilities vis-a-vis the more obvious needs of someone who
uses a wheel chair. Reality appears to only reflect half of a Rawlsian model. While we do not
know what will occur in the future, we are not blind to the past or to present hierarchies of
physical and mental aptitude. Nor do we set aside the existing distribution of wealth when
deciding whether to pay for civil rights measures for people with disabilities. Within this middle
ground lies a substantial opportunity to carry out the full intent of Congress in passing federal
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disability legislation. Now that we have clarified a broad civil rights approach, the legal
community can move on to helping individuals with disabilities obtain reasonable
accommodations.
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